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This paper examines the local labor spillover effect of mergers and acquisitions (M&As). By
focusing on M&As in the manufacturing sector, I find that, in the metropolitan statistical areas
(MSAs) where target firms reside, the negative effect of M&As on employment growth spills over
from the manufacturing sector to the non-tradable sector through shrinking local consumer demand.
Further tests with household-level data confirm this finding. The spillover effect is stronger when
M&A transactions are horizontal and when an MSA relies more heavily on the manufacturing
sector. Finally, lower minimum wage requirements may absorb the negative pressure from M&As
on the non-tradable sector employment growth.
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1. Introduction
On December 11, 2005, DuPont announced its merger with Dow to form DowDupont.
Eighteen days later, DuPont initiated a layoff of 28% of its workforce at the headquarters.
According to a news article, “... DuPont’s layoffs are expected to take a toll on local
restaurants, grocery stores, retailers and home sales as families impacted by the job cuts
curtail spending or leave the area entirely...”2 This example indicates that while M&As
may improve corporate efficiency through workforce restructuring, they may also impact
other economically related firms in the local area. Although prior literature has extensively
studied the effect of M&As on the labor force of target firms, the research on the potential
externality of M&As on the local labor market remains scant.3 In this paper, I investigate
the spillover effect of M&As on target firms’ local labor markets.4
For empirical analysis, I examine how M&As in the manufacturing sector affect
employment growth in the local non-tradable sector. This approach can be justified for
several reasons. First, although employment in the U.S. manufacturing sector has been
decreasing for decades, it has received fresh public attention in recent years because of its
potential profound influence on society. For example, recent studies show that the loss of
manufacturing jobs has contributed to the polarization of U.S. politics in recent elections
(Che et al., 2016; Jensen et al., 2017; Freund and Sidhu, 2017; Autor et al., 2019). Second,
the manufacturing sector usually relies on national or global demand (Adelino et al., 2017).
Therefore, M&As in the manufacturing sector are likely to be driven by local economic

For more details, see “Depressing Atmosphere Envelops DuPont as Layoffs Begin,” The News Journal,
January 4, 2016. https://www.delawareonline.com/story/money/business/2016/01/04/dupont-workerslearning-their-fate-today/78255924/.
3
See Li (2012), John et al. (2015), Ma et al. (2016), Lagaras (2018), and Arnold (2019).
4
Henceforth, I refer to the local labor market around the target firms as the local labor market.
2
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shocks. Studying M&As in the manufacturing sector helps mitigate the concern that
unobserved factors may drive M&A decisions and local employment growth
simultaneously. Third, the manufacturing sector is generally labor-intensive (Bureau of
Labor Statistics 2017), and labor force restructuring is usually a key cost reduction method
for merging firms after deal completion (Maksimovic et al., 2011; Li, 2013). Therefore,
M&As in the manufacturing sector often result in post-merger downsizing, which is the
source of the spillover effect I analyze.5 Finally, I analyze the employment growth in the
non-tradable sector. As the non-tradable sector is primarily driven by local consumer
demand, the employment change I measure is less likely to be confounded by aggregate
shocks to national income (e.g., Moretti, 2010; Mian and Sufi, 2014; Giroud and Mueller,
2017).
Following previous studies (e.g., Maksimovic et al., 2011; Tate and Yang, 2016;
Lagaras, 2018), I hypothesize that M&As represent employment shocks at the target firms,
and hence, focus my empirical analysis only on the target firms. In Appendix A1, I present
a simple theoretical model to illustrate how M&As in the manufacturing sector may affect
employment growth in the local non-tradable sector. The model indicates that a merger can
reduce aggregate employment and total labor income in the manufacturing sector. The
reduced labor income in the manufacturing sector results in lower consumer demand for
the non-tradable sector goods and services. As a result, the non-tradable sector is forced to
cut production and labor inputs. Thus, the employment shock in the manufacturing sector
spills over to the non-tradable sector.

5

Henceforth, I refer to M&As in the manufacturing sector as M&As.
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Before testing the empirical implications of the model, I use establishment-level data
to confirm the effect of M&As on employment at the target establishments. Using a
difference-in-differences test, I find that establishments that belong to M&A targets and
have their headquarters located in the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) experience an
additional 15.3% decline in total employment level compared to the matched control
sample. This finding is consistent with the previous studies by Li (2013), Lagaras (2018),
and Arnold (2019), and provides support for the following tests on the potential spillover
effect.
However, an M&A must be substantially large to have a major impact on the local
area. Therefore, I follow Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011) to identify MSAs that experienced
a significant jump in merger activities in a specific quarter (henceforth referred to as M&A
Events). After identifying these M&A Events, I use data from the U.S. Census Quarterly
Workforce Indicators (QWI) and estimate an MSA-quarter panel regression. I find that, on
average, an M&A Event is associated with a 34-basis-point lower annual employment
growth in the local manufacturing sector for the next three years. This represents
approximately a one-third drop from the unconditional mean of the manufacturing sector
employment growth.
Moreover, lower employment growth is not restricted to the manufacturing sector.
Tests with the non-tradable sector show that the annual employment growth rate in the nontradable sector is 10.9-basis-point lower after an M&A Event in the local area. Given that
the non-tradable sector is primarily driven by local demand (e.g., Moretti, 2010; Mian and
Sufi, 2014), my finding suggests that M&A Events are associated with a negative spillover
effect on the local labor market because of lower consumer demand. A simple back-of-the8

envelope calculation suggests that one job loss in the manufacturing sector after an M&A
Event is accompanied by 0.58 potential job losses in the local non-tradable sector.
The main findings of this study are robust to a variety of additional tests. To address
the concern that other confounding factors may drive the lower growth rate in the nontradable sector, I repeat the baseline regression with “false” M&A Event dates. If the
reduction in employment is driven by industry trends or aggregate economic conditions,
then M&A Events with completion dates “falsely” set three years before the actual dates
should have similar effects as the actual events. However, the placebo test fails to replicate
the same pattern as the baseline results. The results are also robust when I exclude
overlapping M&A Events or define M&A Events using alternative measures. I further test
the robustness by excluding sample periods after 2007 to address the concern that the
baseline results are driven by the Great Recession, which not only decreased consumer
demand but also increased industry restructuring activities. Finally, I control for the impact
of import competition from China on local areas to address the potential confounding effect
of foreign competition. The empirical results consistently support the spillover effect of
M&A Events in all robustness tests.
One key identification challenge is that unobserved local economic shocks could cause
an MSA to experience an M&A Event and reduce local employment growth
simultaneously. To address this concern, I construct a measure to capture the exogenous
variation in the probability of an MSA experiencing an M&A Event. Prior studies have
shown that firms with lower valuations are more likely to become targets in corporate
takeovers (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Edmans et al., 2012). Similarly, undervalued
industries are more likely to become target industries in mergers (Rhodes-Kropf and
9

Viswanathan, 2004; Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005). When a national shock hits a specific
manufacturing industry and reduces the industry valuation, the industry is more likely to
become a target industry for M&As. At the same time, some regions are hit harder than
others because their preexisting economic structure leaves them more exposed to industry
valuation shocks. Therefore, the identification strategy rests on the idea that areas with
higher average valuation should have a lower probability of experiencing M&A Events. 6 I
follow the spirit of existing literature and interact the preexisting composition of an MSA’s
manufacturing sector with the sector’s aggregate valuation shock to predict the exogenous
variation in the probability of an M&A event.7 The results from the two-stage-least-square
(2SLS) estimation are consistent with the baseline results and confirm the adverse spillover
effect of M&A on the local non-tradable sector employment.
To further confirm the effect of M&A Events on local employment growth, I use
household level data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) to test
the employment change at the individual level. The granular data at the household level
enables me to control for individual characteristics and heterogeneity. I find results
consistent with MSA-level findings. Individuals who work not only in the manufacturing
sector but also in the non-tradable sector suffer from downsizing associated with M&A
Events. An individual who worked in the manufacturing sector (non-tradable sector) before
an M&A Event is found to be 2.4% (3.7%) more likely to become unemployed in the postM&A Event period.

6

To mitigate the concern that local economic shocks may drive the aggregate industry valuation (e.g., a flood
in Michigan may cause a valuation decrease for the auto industry), I “clean” the valuation measure by
orthogonalizing it with respect to average local economic shocks. See section 4.2 for more details.
7
A similar approach has been adopted by Bartik (1991), Blanchard et al. (1992), Autor et al. (2013), and
Adelino et al. (2017).
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To provide further evidence on the decline in local consumer demand and explore the
potential channel, I test the effect of M&As on wage growth and workforce migration. An
M&A Event is associated with reduced wage growth in both the manufacturing and nontradable sectors. Further tests on the effect of M&As on workforce migration show that
M&A Events also correlate with lower population growth, lower labor force growth, and
lower net migration inflow in the next three years. I use the total payroll growth in the nontradable sector as a proxy for sales growth because of the unavailability of a direct measure
of sales growth in the non-tradable sector. Considering that the non-tradable sector is
usually labor-intensive and very competitive, the total payroll should account for a
relatively constant share of total sales, and hence, the total payroll growth should be in line
with the sales growth. 8 I find that M&A Events are negatively related to total payroll
growth in the non-tradable sector, corroborating the theoretical prediction that the decrease
in non-tradable sector employment is due to lower consumer demand for goods and
services. Overall, the findings on wage and migration change provide additional support
for the hypothesis that M&A in the manufacturing sector lead to lower employment growth
in the local non-tradable sector.
Next, I investigate whether the spillover effect of M&A Events varies across MSAs
and different types of M&A deals. First, MSAs that rely more heavily on the manufacturing
sector are more likely to experience a spillover effect on the non-tradable sector
employment after an M&A Event. Second, compared to other mergers, horizontal mergers

8

According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, the labor share (ratio of employee compensation and
proprietors’ labor compensation to the total output) only declined by 3% from 1997 to 2014 in the retail trade
industry. Meanwhile, the labor share in the nondurable goods sector declined by 15% during the same period.
See https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2017/article/estimating-the-us-labor-share.htm for more details.
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are associated with a stronger need for, as well as greater flexibility in, cost reduction and
labor restructuring. Hence, M&A Events that consist of horizontal deals should have a
more pronounced impact on the local non-tradable sector employment. Tests on subsamples and with M&A Events defined based on different types of deals confirm both
conjectures.
As M&As pose externalities on target firms’ local labor markets, do various labor
protections have differential effects on the spillover? I investigate this by analyzing the role
of minimum wage requirements on M&A spillovers. As non-tradable sector firms are more
sensitive to the change in the minimum wage (Cengiz et al., 2019), the level of the
minimum wage in the local state may affect firms’ ability to cope with adverse demand
shocks. I find that while lower employment growth in the manufacturing sector is persistent
in all states, the slowdown in the non-tradable sector employment growth only occurs in
states with minimum wages higher than the federal level. Additional tests also indicate that
non-tradable sector employers in areas with low minimum wage levels might handle
downward pressure by reducing the wage levels. These results imply that a lower level of
minimum wage could help firms in the non-tradable sector absorb negative demand shocks
and mitigate the adverse outcomes of M&A Events on local consumer demand.
This study is closely related to the growing literature on employment and merger
decisions. The extant literature has focused on several aspects. First, the labor market
provides motives for corporate M&As (Ouimet and Zarutskie, 2016; Tate and Yang, 2016).
Second, M&As are associated with changes in post-merger employment levels, wages, and
the composition of the workforce (Ma et al., 2016; Olsson and Tåg, 2017; Lagaras, 2018;
Arnold, 2019). Finally, labor restructuring in the form of layoffs is a primary source of
12

synergies and value creation in corporate takeovers (John et al., 2015; Dessaint et al., 2017).
This study contributes to the literature by demonstrating that the effect of M&As on
employment is not restricted to the target facilities but spills over to other industries in the
local area through reduced consumer demand.
The study also adds to the literature on local consumer demand changes and the nontradable sector employment fluctuation. Moretti (2010) suggests that each new job created
has a local multiplier. Mian et al. (2013) and Mian and Sufi (2014) illustrate that losses in
housing net wealth are associated with a drop in household consumption and non-tradable
sector employment. Giroud and Mueller (2017) and Giroud and Mueller (2019) explore the
role of firms in employment growth in responses to declines in local consumer demand.
This study contributes to the literature by identifying a decline in non-tradable sector
employment caused by M&As in the manufacturing sector. The findings may also benefit
the studies that focus on the decline in the U.S. manufacturing sector (e.g., Autor et al.,
2013; Autor and Dorn, 2013; Pierce and Schott, 2016) as they provide evidence on the
underlying social cost of this decline.
Lastly, the study builds a link between corporate events and the welfare of households.
Shleifer and Summers (1988) suggest that hostile takeovers may boost shareholders’ gain
at the cost of other stakeholders. Butler et al. (2017) and Cornaggia et al. (2018) study the
spillover effect of initial public offerings and find contrary results. Bernstein et al. (2018)
study the effect of different bankruptcy approaches on the local economy and find that
liquidated establishments affect employment adversely. In contrast to these studies, this
study sheds light on the spillover effect resulting from corporate restructuring and helps
complete the picture of how corporate events may affect overall social welfare.
13

The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and
summary statistics. Section 3 presents the effect of M&A Events on the local employment
growth in MSAs where target firms are headquartered. Section 4 provides further evidence
on the local labor market spillover of M&A Events. Section 5 presents the results on the
wage change, cross-sectional variation, and role of minimum wage requirements, and
section 6 concludes.

2. Data
2.1. MSA-Level Data
The MSA-level analysis uses the publicly available data from the U.S. Census QWI,
which are derived from the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics program at the
Census Bureau and provide employment and wage information based on detailed firm
characteristics, such as geography, industry, age, and size. My main analysis focuses on
MSA-level data instead of county-level data for two reasons. First, for reasons of
confidentiality, the U.S. Census blocks out some of the variables from the publicly
available QWI data. This missing variable issue is more severe at the county level than at
the MSA level. Second, the local labor market is not constrained at the local counties; the
workforce can migrate between counties while MSAs are larger areas and inter-MSA
travels are less frequent. I focus on the employment growth in the manufacturing sector
(two-digit NAICS code 31-33) and the non-tradable sector, which consists of Retail Trade
(two-digit NAICS code 44-45) and Accommodation and Food Services (two-digit NAICS

14

code 72).9 (see, e.g., Mian and Sufi, 2014; Adelino et al., 2017; Bernstein et al., 2018) The
data on population, and income per capita comes from the Bureau of Economic Analysis
and is available at the MSA year level dating back to 1990. Finally, I obtain the data on the
labor force and the unemployment rate from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. After merging
all the data sources, my final sample contains 24,107 MSA-quarter observations from 345
MSAs.
2.2. M&A Data
I obtain the data on M&As from Securities Data Company (SDC). From all the deals
between 1990 and 2014 with target firms belonging to the manufacturing sector, I exclude
leveraged buyouts, spinoffs, recapitalizations, self-tender offers, exchange offers,
repurchases, partial equity purchases, acquisitions of remaining interest, and privatizations.
I also require that both the acquirers and targets are in the United States as cross-border
mergers may be driven by different purposes with domestic deals. Finally, the transaction
value should be at least $45 million in 2010 dollars for a target to be included in the
sample.10
For each target, I obtain the target zip code from SDC to identify its location. If the zip
code of the target is missing in SDC, I collect the address of the target’s headquarters from
Compustat, whereever available. One concern with the empirical analysis is that the target
zip code reported in the SDC data is usually the zip codes of the target’s headquarters. If a

9

Mian and Sufi (2014) define the non-tradable sector at the four-digit North American industry classification
service (NAICS) code level, but the QWI data provides the best coverage at the two-digit NAICS sectoral
level. As argued by Adelino et al. (2017), the definition of the non-tradable sector as Retail Trade (two-digit
NAICS code 44-45) and Accommodation and Food Services (two-digit NAICS code 72) provides the closest
match with this definition.
10
This is equivalent to the top tercile of the transaction value in my sample.
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target firm operates in multiple geographic areas, the empirical analysis may overlook the
employment effect in their subsidiary areas. To address this concern, I match the SDC data
with the Publicly Listed National Establishment Time Series (NETS) data and check the
geographic concentration of target’s employment. Using a matching method based on
name, location, and industry, I successfully match 569 SDC deals with the NETS data.
In Table A1, I report the employment concentration of the targets.11 On average, 58.2%
of the target employments locate in the headquarters MSAs while the same ratio is only
38.6% for the acquirers. About half of the target companies have at least 60% of their
employees in the headquarters MSAs. In addition, about 72% of the target companies in
the sample have the highest employment in their headquarters MSAs while the same ratio
is only 60% for acquirers. Overall, a significant portion of target companies’ employment
concentrates in the headquarters MSAs, confirming the validity of using location
information from SDC.
There are two empirical challenges in identifying the influential mergers in local MSAs.
First, theoretically, a merger needs to be substantially large to have a major impact on the
local labor market. Second, for some MSAs, there are more than one mergers in each
quarter or in consecutive quarters, posing a challenge to identify the merger that had a real
impact. To address such issues, I follow the previous studies on merger waves and identify
significant jumps of M&A activities in each MSA. A similar approach has been adopted
by previous studies, such as Harford (2005) and Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011).
Specifically, for each MSA in the sample, I measure the quarterly M&A activities as the

11

In table A1, I also report information on the employment concentration of the acquirers for comparison.
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total transaction value of all deals announced in the quarter. Then I calculate the time series
mean of transaction values in each MSA. I classify an MSA as having experienced an
M&A Event in a given quarter when the combined transaction value in that quarter is at
least two standard deviations higher than the time-series mean transaction value in the same
MSA. This definition ensures that the M&A Events measured in the paper are significant
consolidation in local areas. It also provides a clean pre-event period during which there
was relatively little M&A activity. With such a definition, there are 282 M&A Events in
my final sample.12
2.3. Establishment-Level Data
The establishment-level employment data are from the NETS Database. The NETS
data provide time-series information on establishment locations, employments, estimated
sales, business lines, economic performance (job and sales growth, DB Ratings, payment
performance), and type of establishments (standalone, headquarters, or branch). I obtain
the employment and sales information for establishments that were publicly listed between
1990 and 2014 (which is the last year of the data available to me). I match the NETS data
with SDC based on names, location, and industry of the headquarters establishments at the
deal announcement year. I then remove establishments in Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto
Rico. 13 Following Lagaras (2018) and Arnold (2019), I focus my analysis only on
establishments with at least 50 employees during the year before deal announcements. To
keep consistency with the main tests, I only keep the target establishments located in the

12

Tests with alternative definitions of M&A Events find statistically and economically similar results.
Results of the baseline regressions with alternative definitions of M&A Events are reported in table A5.
13
The employment data in the NETS database has been validated and used by many of the existing studies
such as Asker et al. (2015), Faccio and Hsu (2017), Appel et al. (2019), Borisov et al. (2019), Chava et al.
(2019).
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headquarters MSAs. For each target establishment, I follow Li (2013), and construct a
control group based on the following criteria: 1) the establishment operates in the same
two-digit NAICS sector; 2) the establishment does not experience any M&A activities
during [T-3, T+3] period of the merger; and 3) the establishment is in the same employment
decile and sales decile as the target establishment. For each merged establishment, I select
one control establishment with employment level closest to the target establishment before
the year of the deal announcement. I then test the employment change three years before
and three years after the merger. In Table A2, I provide the summary statistics of the
establishment level data.
2.4. Household-Level Data
My sample of the household analysis is drawn from the 1995 and 2003 panels of the
micro-level SIPP data because households’ MSA information is no longer available in the
SIPP data after 2003. Each SIPP panel tracks 60,000 to 80,000 individuals over a period
of up to four years. From the SIPP data, I obtain employment-related information regarding
individuals’ employment status, occupation, industry, work experience, and income.
Additionally, I obtain information on demographics, such as age, sex, race, marital status,
household size, and educational attainment. I exclude individuals below the age of 16 or
above the age of 70 as they are less likely to be active in the labor market. I also exclude
individuals with missing geographic information. As a result, my final sample includes
93,795 individuals. In Table A3, I report the summary statistics of the household level data.
2.5. Summary Statistics

18

Table 1 reports the summary statistics. There are a total of 24,107 observations from
345 MSAs.14 On average, about 4% of the MSA-quarter observations show at least one
influential M&A Event in the sample. In an average MSA, about 16% of the total
employees work in the manufacturing sector and about 24% work in the non-tradable sector.
The average quarterly wage (in 2010 dollars) for workers in the manufacturing sector is
$13,819.34, while it is only $6,803.44 for workers in the non-tradable sector.
M&As in the manufacturing sector in the U.S. have been substantial, both in terms of
absolute dollar value and the fraction of all merger deals. As Figure 1a shows, on average,
about 20%-25% of the U.S. targets are from the manufacturing sector. Although the
proportion of deals in the manufacturing sector has been decreasing since 2010, possibly
because of an overall decline in the sector, the average transaction value is still higher than
the merger deals in other sectors. Figure 1b presents the dollar value of all deals and the
fraction of all deals with targets from the manufacturing sector. On average, deals in the
manufacturing sector account for about 30% of all transaction value in the U.S. Both the
absolute dollar amount and the fraction show a trend that fluctuates in the sample period.
It drops in the early 1990s, and then increases from the late 1990s until it reaches the first
peak at the beginning of the 21st century. It then drops to its lowest level in 2004 before
climbing back up in 2005 and stays at the level till 2010. Both the dollar amount and the
fraction of acquisitions in the manufacturing sector decreased in recent years and stayed at
a relatively low level after 2010.

14

Different states started reporting to the QWI at different time. For example, Massachusetts did not start
reporting until 2010.
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Figure 2 presents the geographic distribution of M&As in the manufacturing sector.
Figure 2a shows the number of deals in each county from 1990 to 2014, while Figure 2b
shows the total transaction value (in 2010 dollars) in each county during the same period.
The acquisitions in the manufacturing sector show concentration in certain geographical
areas. For example, most of the deals are concentrated in the northeast as well as on the
west coast, most likely because of the geographic concentration of industries.

3. Effect of M&As on Employment Growth
3.1. Target Establishment Level Analysis
Although a general decline in the target employment level has been well documented
by previous studies (Li, 2013; Lagaras, 2018; Arnold, 2019), in this section, I formally
present a test to show the change in employment at the target firms using establishment
level from NETS data. Especially, I focus on target establishments in the headquarters
MSA. For each target establishment, I select a control establishment by matching on the
two-digit NAICS, employment decile, and sales decile at the year before the deal
announcement. If multiple control establishments are found, I choose the establishment
with the closest employment level. The identifying assumption for this test is that the target
and control establishments should follow similar trends in employment change in the
absence of the merger.
Following previous studies, I estimate the following matched difference-in-differences
design:15

15

Existing studies such as Li (2013), Ma et al. (2016), Lagaras (2018) and Arnold (2019). use similar
approaches to test the establishment-level employment change after M&As.
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𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐸𝑚𝑝)𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜔𝑡 +
𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,

(1)

where 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐸𝑚𝑝)𝑖,𝑡 is the log employment of establishment i at time t. 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 is the
indicator for the periods after the M&A deal completion. 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖 is an indicator that
equals one if the establishment is a target of an M&A deal and locates in the headquarters
MSA. The interaction term 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 captures the average treatment effect of the
M&A deals. 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is a vector that contains characteristics of the establishment and the
establishment’s MSA. 16 𝜃𝑖 measures the year fixed effects and 𝜔𝑡 measures the
establishment fixed effects. 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. 𝛽3 is the main coefficient of interest. A
negative and statistically significant 𝛽3 implies that M&As have a negative impact on the
employment level at the target establishments. Standard errors are clustered at the
establishment level.
Table 2 reports the regression results. In columns (1) to (3) of Table 2, the dependent
variable is the log(employment) at the establishment. In column (1), the coefficient of
Target × Post is negative and statistically significant. It indicates that compared to the
control establishments, the target establishments on average experienced a greater decline
in employment level. The coefficient of -0.097 indicates that compared to the control
establishments, the target establishments on average experience a 9.7% decrease in
employment after the merger. In column (2) of table 2, I include firm level control variables
such as log (Establishment Age) and log (Number of branches). The coefficient of Target
× Post remains negative and statistically significant. The target establishments on average

16

The control variables include log (age of the establishment), log (number of total branches of the company),
log (MSA total population), log (MSA average income) and the MSA unemployment rate.
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experience a 15.5% decline in employment level relative to the control establishments. In
column (3), I further control for population, average income, and the unemployment rate
of the establishments’ MSA to address the potential influence of local economic conditions
on the employment change at the establishments. The estimated results remain statistically
and economically unchanged. Overall, the results indicate a general decline in the
employment level at the target establishments in the headquarters MSA after the
completion of the mergers. The finding is consistent with previous studies (Li,2012;
Li,2013; Lagaras, 2018; and Arnold, 2019). The finding that M&As are associated with a
decline in the employment level provides support for my hypothesis and tests in the
following sections.
3.2. MSA Level Analysis
My analysis of the local spillover effect of M&A Events is based on the comparison
between MSAs that experienced M&As Events at different times. In the baseline analysis,
I estimate the following MSA-quarter level panel regression:
𝐸𝑚𝑝 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑚,𝑡,𝑡+12 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑚,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑋𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜂𝑚 + 𝜋𝑡 + ε𝑚,𝑡 ,

(2)

where 𝐸𝑚𝑝 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑚,𝑡,𝑡+12 measures the annualized three-year employment growth rate
of MSA m. I focus on the three-year employment growth rate because it takes time to
restructure the labor force after an M&A Event (Maksimovic et al, 2011). Specifically, to
calculate the employment growth rate, I compare the employment of a sector at quarter t
(EMPt) with the employment level of the same sector at quarter t+12 (𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑡+12 ). The
employment growth rate is defined as (𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑡+12 − 𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑡 )/𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑡 . 𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑚,𝑡 is an
indicator that equals one if MSA m experienced an significant jump in merger activities in
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the past four quarters.17 𝑋𝑚,𝑡 denotes a vector of time-varying demographic characteristics
including the MSA level population growth rate and the total income growth rate. In the
main model specifications, I also control for the indicator whether the local MSA has a
higher presence of the manufacturing sector than the national median. The rationale is that
MSAs with varying degrees of dependency on the manufacturing sector might be affected
differently by M&As in the manufacturing sector. I include MSA and year-quarter fixed
effects, which are denoted by 𝜂𝑚 and 𝜋𝑡 , respectively, to control time-invariant
heterogeneity and time trends.
3.2.1. Effect on Employment growth in the Manufacturing Sector
Table 3 reports the results of the baseline regressions. The dependent variable is the
annualized three-year employment growth rate (× 100) in the manufacturing sector. In
column (1), I control for the MSA and year-quarter fixed effects. The coefficient -0.255
indicates that, compared with the MSAs not experiencing an M&A Event in the past four
quarters, MSAs with M&A Events are associate with a 25.5-basis-point lower annual
employment growth rate in the next three years. This result is economically significant
compared to the unconditional mean of -1.119%. In column (2), I control for MSA
characteristics by including the population growth rate and the personal income growth
rate in the regression. The coefficient of the M&A Event indicator remains negative and
statistically significant. The coefficient decreases from 0.255 to 0.240 compared to column
(1), but the magnitude remains economically large.

17

The results estimated with windows from 1-3 quarters are consistent with the baseline findings.
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In column (3), I control for whether the MSA relies heavily on the manufacturing sector
to address the possibility that the M&A Event variable could, in part, be picking up an
overall declining trend in the U.S. manufacturing sector rather than being caused by an
M&A Event. The high manufacturing area indicator is equal to one if the share of the
manufacturing sector employment in the MSA is higher than the national median. The
estimated coefficient indicates that an MSA with high presence of the manufacturing sector
is on average associated with a 1.78 percentage points lower employment growth rate in
the next three years. Finally, in column (4), I introduce the state × quarter fixed effects to
address the possibility of heterogeneous trends across states. Some states might experience
specific transitions in industry composition. For example, the manufacturing sector in
Michigan might be going through a decline while the manufacturing sector in Tennessee
is experiencing an expansion. Therefore, controlling for the state × quarter fixed effects
can effectively address the possible bias caused by state level time varying heterogeneity.
The coefficient on the M&A Event dummy remains statistically significant at -0.335,
indicating that MSAs with M&A Events in the past four quarters are associated with a
33.5-basis-point lower annualized three-year employment growth in the manufacturing
sector.
Taken together, the results from columns (1) to (4) suggest that a significant jump in
M&A activities is associated with a sector-wide employment slowdown in the MSA where
the targets are located. Lagaras (2018) finds that M&As are associated with a significant
decline in the employment in the target firms through increased layoffs. My findings show
that the negative effect on employment growth can spread to the whole manufacturing
sector.
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3.2.2. Effect on Employment Growth in the Non-Tradable Sector
The previous section has established the relation between M&A Events and the decline
in the employment growth rate in the manufacturing sector. In this section, I examine the
spillover of the negative effect on employment growth to the non-tradable sector. As
illustrated by Mian and Sufi (2014), the non-tradable sector, such as retail and restaurants,
depends heavily on the local demand. Consequently, layoffs after M&As are expected to
lower the average wages and consumer demand of the local community. I follow Mian and
Sufi (2014) and Adelino et al. (2017) to define the non-tradable sector as consisting of
Retail Trade (two-digit NAICS 44-45) and Accommodation and Food Services (two-digit
NAICS 72). I replace the dependent variable in the baseline regressions with the annualized
three-year employment growth rate in the non-tradable sector and repeat the regressions
specified in equation (1). Table 4 reports the results.
In Table 4, columns (1) to (4) repeat the tests matching the same columns reported in
Table 3. In column (1), the model with no control variables indicates that an MSA with an
M&A Event in the past four quarters is associated with a 0.103% lower annual employment
growth rate in the non-tradable sector for the next three years. Further, in columns (2) and
(3), where I control for MSA characteristics, the economic magnitude of the coefficient on
the M&A Event stays similar. The coefficients on M&A Event dummy is economically
significant compared to the unconditional sample mean of 1.171%. Finally, I repeat the
same process as in Table 3 and control for state ×time fixed effects. The coefficient on the
M&A Event is 10.9 basis points, indicating that an M&A Event correlates to a 10.9-basispoint lower annual employment growth in the non-tradable sector. I adopt column (4) in
Table 4 as the main model specification in the remaining of the paper.
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Overall, the results in Table 4 indicate that there is a “hidden” cost of M&As that is
borne by the local community where the targets are located.18 By laying off redundant
workforce and improving corporate efficiency, M&As are associated with a slower
employment growth in the local area, not only for the manufacturing sector where the
targets belong, but also for other sectors, such as the non-tradable sector.
4. Robustness Analysis
4.1. Placebo Event Dates and Alternative Definitions of Events
Table 4 shows that M&As are associated with slower employment growth in the nontradable sector. In this section, I first employ a placebo test to address the concern that the
above results might be driven by other confounding factors. Specifically, I change the
timing of the M&A Events by replacing the event dates with placebo event dates that are
12 quarters before the actual dates. If acquirers pick up targets from areas with deteriorating
conditions in the manufacturing sector or the local economy, then it is the deteriorating
economic condition, rather than the M&A Events, that causes the findings reported in the
previous sections. In this case, the placebo M&A Event dates should have a similarly
negative impact on employment growth. Column (1) of Table 5 reports the result of the
test with the placebo event dates. The dependent variable is the annualized three-year
employment growth rate in the non-tradable sector. The coefficient on the M&A Event
dummy is neither statistically nor economically significant, indicating that it is not the
long-term trend in the local economy that drives the results reported in the previous

18

In appendix table A4, I also test the effect of M&A Events on the overall employment growth rate of the
MSA. M&A events are found to be negatively associated with the total employment growth of the MSA.
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sections. Rather, it is the M&A Events that may cause slower employment growth in the
MSAs.
Second, I address the potential effect of the overlapping M&A Events. Specifically, if
one MSA experiences multiple significant jumps in M&A activities within three years, the
estimated employment change after the first M&A Event might be contaminated by the
following events. This might cause a bias in the estimated results. To address this concern,
I “clean” the events by only keeping the first M&A Event in an MSA if there are multiple
M&A Events within a three-year window. I then repeat the regression with the cleaned
M&A Event dummy in column (2) of Table 5. As can be seen, the coefficient on the M&A
Event dummy is consistent with the baseline regression.
Third, as Figure 1 shows, a large fraction of the M&As in the manufacturing sector
took place around the Financial Crisis. The crisis could also affect local consumer demand
by lowering household net wealth (Mian et al., 2013). To address this concern, I exclude
the employment growth data after 2007 and repeat the baseline regression. The results on
the non-tradable sector employment growth are similar to the baseline results. Finally, the
competition from China has caused a decline of the employment in the manufacturing
sector (e.g., Autor et al., 2013; Pierce and Schott, 2016). The pressure may also lead to
lower employment growth in the local non-tradable sector. Therefore, I follow Autor et al.
(2013) and estimate the local areas’ exposure to the Chinese import penetration.19 I repeat
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I first obtain the data of the industry-level trade flows from China to the U.S. between 1991 and 2007. The
data is available on David Dorn’s website (https://www.ddorn.net/data.htm). I then follow Autor et al. (2013)
to interact the industry level import flow with the MSA’s share of employment in each industry in 1990. I
aggregate the interacted value for each MSA and use it to measure an MSA’s exposure to the import
competition from China. Finally, I scale the MSA’s exposure to import competition by U.S. real GDP. Note
that the import flow data is only available from 1991 to 2007 so the test in column (4) of Table 5 is from
1991 to 2007.
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baseline tests while controlling for the effect of local exposure to the Chinese import. The
effect of M&A Events in column (4) remains similar to the baseline regression. Overall,
tests in Table 5 confirm the findings from the baseline tests that M&As in manufacturing
sector have a negative spillover effect on the local labor market in areas where the target
firms are located.
The empirical tests in Table 3 and Table 4 are based on the definition of M&A Events,
which is an indicator equal to one when the combined transaction value in a quarter is at
least two standard deviations higher than the mean transaction value in the local MSA. In
Table A5, I test the robustness of results reported in Table 3 and Table 4 by using
alternative definitions of M&A Events. First, I change the definition of M&A Events to an
indicator that equals one when the combined transaction value in a quarter is one standard
deviation or three standard deviations higher than the mean transaction value in the local
MSA. Second, I define the M&A Events based on the largest deal in terms of transaction
value. Third, I construct a continuous measure and replace M&A Event dummy with the
log of combined transaction value in the MSA during the last four quarters. The results in
Table A5 are both statistically and economically consistent with baseline results when
M&A Events are measured with alternative definitions.20
4.2. 2SLS Analysis
The previous sections reveal that M&A Events in the manufacturing sector are
correlated with a negative spillover effect on non-tradable sector employment by lowering
local consumer demand. However, the correlation can hardly be interpreted as causal

20

I also repeat the test by replacing the dependent variable with the annualized five-year employment growth
rate. The results are consistent with the baseline regression. See table A5 for more details.
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because unobserved economic factors could drive both employment growth in the nontradable sector and an M&A Event at the same time. To provide more evidence on the
relation between M&A Events and local labor market spillovers, I construct a measure to
capture the exogenous variation in the probability of an MSA experiencing an M&A Event.
The literature connecting stock market valuation with corporate takeovers finds that
undervalued firms are more likely to be selected as targets in takeovers (Shleifer and
Vishny, 2003; Edmans et al., 2012). Similarly, if more firms from the same industry are
undervalued, the industry should be more likely to become a target industry (Rhodes-Kropf
and Viswanathan, 2004; Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005). Hence, if an undervalued industry
accounts for a large fraction of the local employment, the area might be more appealing for
potential acquirers and be more likely to experience an M&A Event. Overall, this
identification strategy hinges on the notion that MSAs with various exposure to
undervalued industries might have different ex-ante probabilities to experience M&A
Events.
I identify the exogenous shocks on the local valuation in the following way
𝑆𝑚,𝑡 = ∑𝑖

𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑖,𝑚
𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑚

𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 ,

(3)

where 𝑆𝑚,𝑡 measures the valuation shock to MSA m at time t. 𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑖,𝑚 measures the
employment of four-digit NAICS manufacturing industry i of MSA m when the MSA first
enters the sample. 𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑚 measures the total employment of MSA m when the MSA first
enters the sample. I measure the local presence of an industry using the first available
observation of an MSA to mitigate the concern of potential feedback effect from local labor
market to stock market valuation. I follow Edmans et al. (2012) and use 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 as the
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valuation measure. 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 measures by how much the firms from industry i are traded
to their maximum potential value absent managerial inefficiency and mispricing.21 The
identifying assumption in equation (3) is that while the probability of having a merger
target is likely to be endogenously related to local economic conditions, an industry’s
valuation is more likely to be driven by aggregate economic shocks. Areas with various
ex-ante exposure to each industry would have different sensitivities to the fluctuations in
industry valuation. However, the local valuation measure 𝑆𝑚,𝑡 is also subject to potential
bias. If an industry is concentrated in one area, the idiosyncratic shock to that area (e.g.,
housing market crash, natural disasters) could also affect industry valuation. For example,
a flood in Michigan might impact the performance and outlook of the whole auto industry
and lead to a decrease in valuation in the auto manufacturing industry.
To address this issue, I calculate the weighted average discount (weighted by market
𝐿
value) for all firms in the same MSA, 𝑆𝑚,𝑡
. Then, I regress the original measure 𝑆𝑚,𝑡 on
𝐿
𝐿
𝑆𝑚,𝑡
and take the residual term 𝑠̃𝑚,𝑡 . If 𝑆𝑚,𝑡
captures the common valuation shocks shared

by all firms in the local area, 𝑠̃𝑚,𝑡 will be orthogonal to the local economic conditions and
capture the exogenous variation in the probability of an M&A Event in the MSA. I then
estimate the following regression
𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑚,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 × 𝑠̃𝑚,𝑡−1 + 𝛼2 × 𝑋𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑚,𝑡 ,

(4)

Specifically, I follow Edmans et al. (2012) to construct the discount measure based on Tobin’s Q. The
successful firms in an industry are defined as firms that rank on the 80th percentile in their four-digit NAICS
industry. I calculate the discount measure as (Q∗ − Q)/Q∗. See Edmans et al. (2012) for more details. I then
aggregate the discount measure of each industry with the weight of total market cap.
21
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where 𝑋𝑚,𝑡 is a vector of the characteristics of MSA m at time t. 𝛼1 is expected to be
negative if areas with industries that have higher valuation are less likely to experience
an M&A Event. In the second stage, I estimate the following regression
𝐸𝑚𝑝 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑚,𝑡,𝑡+12 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅
𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑚,𝑡 + 𝛽2 × 𝑋𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑚,𝑡 ,

(5)

where 𝐸𝑚𝑝 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑚,𝑡,𝑡+12 is the same as in equation (2) and measures the annualized
three-year employment growth rate. ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅
𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑚,𝑡 denotes the predicted probability of
an M&A Event in the local MSA. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 6 report the results of first
stage regressions. The local discount variable is negative and statistically significant on the
probability of the MSA experiencing an M&A Event. A one SD increase in the local
discount variable is associated with a 1.7% lower probability of an M&A Event. This effect
is economically significant as well, given that the unconditional mean of the M&A Event
is only about 4%. The local discount variable has a strong explanatory power with partial
F-statistics of 22.61 and 22.91 in columns (1) and (2), respectively. In columns (3) and (4),
I test the effect of M&A Events on manufacturing sector employment growth. The reduced
form regression in column (3) indicates that a one SD increase in the local discount variable
is associated with a 50-basis-point increase in the manufacturing sector employment.
Additionally, column (4) suggests that a one SD increase in the local discount variable is
associated with a 70-basis-point higher growth rate in the employment of the non-tradable
sector.
In the last four columns of Table 6, I report the coefficient estimates for the secondstage regressions. All coefficients in columns (5) to (7) show negative and significant effect
of M&A Events on the employment growth rate in the manufacturing and the non-tradable
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sectors, consistent with the ordinary least squares (OLS) results. Including or removing the
control variables do not affect the point estimates significantly. However, it is important to
notice that the point estimates of the 2SLS regressions are much higher than the point
estimates in the OLS regression. The greater 2SLS estimates indicate that M&A Events
driven by differences in valuation lead to a greater drop in employment growth than
average M&A Events. This is possible as the acquiring firms could identify undervalued
targets and realize the potential value gain through labor restructuring. Alternatively, the
2SLS estimates could capture the marginal effect of a large valuation change. Acquiring
firms might only approach a target when the target is significantly undervalued. I use the
OLS model as the preferred model because it shows the average effect of M&A Events and
is more conservative.
4.3. Household Level Analysis
The previous sections have established the relation between M&A Events and the
spillover effect at the MSA level. In this section, I analyze how M&A Events affect the
local labor market using household-year panel data from SIPP. My purpose is to provide
evidence at the micro level to corroborate the findings at the aggregate MSA level.
Specifically, I estimate the following regression:
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑚,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑓𝑔(𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒)𝑖 × 𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑚,𝑡,𝑡−3 +
𝛼2 𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑚,𝑡,𝑡−3 + 𝛼3 𝑋𝑚,𝑡 + 𝛼4 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜂𝑚 + 𝜔𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,
(6)
where 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑚,𝑡 is an indicator of the employment outcome of individual i from MSA
m at time t. 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝐹𝐺(𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒)𝑖 is an indicator that equals one if the individual
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was working in the manufacturing sector (the non-tradable sector) at the first appearance
in the sample. 𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑚,𝑡,𝑡−3 is an indicator equal to one if MSA m experienced an
M&A Event at time (t-3, t). 𝑋𝑚,𝑡 is a vector of the characteristics of MSA m at time t and
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of individual characteristics of individual i. 𝜂𝑚 represents the time invariant
MSA fixed effects. 𝜔𝑡 represents the year fixed effects and 𝜃𝑖 represents the individual
fixed effects. To study the effect of M&A Events on the household, I focus on two
outcomes. First, the probability that an individual stays in the manufacturing sector (the
non-tradable sector) and second, the probability that the individual loses his job after the
M&A Events.
Table A2 reports the summary statistics of the household-level data. The individuals in
the sample have an average age of 40. About 53% of the individuals are married. 10% of
the sample observations work in the manufacturing sector and about 12% work in the nontradable sector.22 Overall, about 73% of the individuals in the sample are employed during
the sample period. Table 7 reports the estimated results.23
In Panel A of Table 7, I test the effect of M&A Events on individuals working in the
manufacturing sector. The 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑓𝑔𝑖 dummy is defined as one if the individual i was
working in the manufacturing sector during the year of her first appearance in the sample.
In columns (1) to (3), the dependent variable is an indicator whether individual i works in
the manufacturing sector. In column (1), I do not include any control variables; in column

22

The relative size of employment in the non-tradable and manufacturing sectors in the QWI data between
1995 and 2003 is similar to that of the SIPP data.
23
In Table 7, I also control the cohort fixed effects of each household. This is to control for the heterogeneity
of households that enter the sample at different years.
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(2), I control for all individual characteristics and MSA characteristics;24 and in column (3),
I control for MSA × year fixed effects to address the potential issue that different MSAs
could have different trends in the local labor market. The coefficient on the interaction term
Initial Mfg × M&A Event is negative and statistically significant, indicating that an
individual working in the manufacturing sector before the M&A Events is less likely to
keep working in the manufacturing sector. The estimated coefficient is equal to -0.069 to 0.067 across three model specifications, indicating that after the M&A Events, a treated
individual is 6.9% to 6.7% less likely to remain in the manufacturing sector. In columns
(4) to (6), I test the probability of an individual being employed after the M&A Events.
The coefficient estimates in columns (4) to (6) indicate that individuals who worked in the
manufacturing sector before the completion of mergers are 1.9% to 2.4% more likely to
become unemployed during the three-year period after the M&A Events.
Further, I test the effect of M&A Events on workers in the non-tradable sector. The
Initial Non-tradable dummy in Panel B of Table 7 is defined as one if an individual was
working in the non-tradable sector during the year of first appearance in the sample. Like
the results of Panel A, the coefficient on Initial Non-tradable × M&A Event is negative
and statistically significant in all specifications, indicating that individuals who worked in
the non-tradable sector are more likely to leave the sector after M&A Events. The effect is
also economically significant. In columns (1) to (3) of Panel B, a treated individual is about
9.8% less likely to work in the non-tradable sector after an M&A Event.

24

The control variables include MSA population, average income, unemployment rate, household size, age,
college degree, and whether the individual is married.
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Further, as columns (4) to (6) indicate, an individual working in the non-tradable sector
is 4.4% more likely to become unemployed after M&A Events. Overall, the results from
Table 7 confirm the findings that M&As in the manufacturing sector not only lead to a
reduction in employment in the manufacturing sector, but also lead to a negative spillover
on employment in the non-tradable sector.
5. Wage, Migration and Cross-sectional Variation
5.1. Effect of M&A Events on Wages and Labor Migration
The previous sections have documented a negative spillover effect on employment
growth from the manufacturing sector to the local non-tradable sector after significant
M&A Events. In this section, I explore the potential channels of the effect by testing the
wage change and migrations. Existing works such as Moretti (2010), Mian and Sufi (2014),
Adelino et al. (2017) and Bernstein et al. (2018) suggest that firms in the non-tradable
sector, such as retailers and restaurants, depends heavily on the local demand. As shown in
the theoretical model in the Appendix, the change in employment in the manufacturing
sector diffuses to the non-tradable sector through fluctuations in total labor income. If
M&As have a negative effect on employment in the manufacturing sector, the decreasing
total labor income in the manufacturing sector then reduces the local consumer demand for
products in the non-tradable sector. This will lead to lower employment growth in the local
non-tradable sector.
Due to the data limitation, I cannot directly examine the change of sales growth in the
local non-tradable sector businesses in the current version of the paper. Therefore, in this
section, I provide some supporting evidence of drops in local consumer demand following
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M&A Events. First, I analyze the effect of M&A Events on the MSA’s wage growth in
Panel A of Table 8. In column (1), I study the change in wage growth in the manufacturing
sector. The dependent variable is the annualized three-year quarterly wage growth in the
manufacturing sector. An M&A Event is negatively correlated with the three-year wage
growth rate with a coefficient of -0.203. The coefficient indicates that MSAs with an M&A
Event are expected to experience a 20.3-basis-point lower annual growth in wage in the
manufacturing sector. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that M&As are
associated with a higher probability of layoffs, which reduces labor demand and lead to
lower wages.
Next, I shift my focus to the wage growth in the non-tradable sector. Column (2) shows
that M&A Events are associated with a 16.2-basis-point lower annual wage growth in the
non-tradable sector. This finding is inconsistent with that of Mian and Sufi (2014), who
find little evidence on wage change in the non-tradable sector after financial crisis,
potentially due to differences in sample period and nature of the events. In column (3) of
Panel A in Table 8, I use the non-tradable sector total payroll growth as a proxy of the sales
growth in the local non-tradable sector. The underlying assumption is that the payroll for
employees accounts for a relatively constant fraction of the total sales in the non-tradable
sector. In column (3), the M&A Events are associated with a 23.8-basis-point lower total
payroll growth in the non-tradable sector, indicating that the total sales growth is also lower
in the local non-tradable sector following M&A Events.
In Panel B of Table 8, I explore the effect of M&A Events on the migration of
workforce. Following Mian and Sufi (2014), I use three different measures to test labor
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mobility response after M&A Events.25 Column (1) correlates the MSA level population
growth rate with the M&A Events. There is weak evidence that the M&A Events are
associated with a decline in the MSA population growth. The coefficient on the M&A
Event dummy is negative but only statistically significant at the 10% level. In columns (2)
and (3), I test the employment mobility using two alternative measures. In column (2), the
annualized three-year labor force growth rate negatively correlates with M&A Events.
Finally, in column (3), I use IRS tax return data and test the effect of M&A activities on
net migration inflow. The net migration inflow is measured as number of the net inmigration per 100 people in next three years. Column (3) indicates that M&A Events are
associated with 0.238 fewer in-migration per 100 people in next three years. When
combined, the results from Panel B of Table 8 further confirm a decline in local consumer
demand after M&A Events.
5.2. Cross-sectional Variation
5.2.1. MSA Heterogeneity
In this section, I test whether MSAs with different degrees of dependence on the
manufacturing sector are affected deferentially by M&As. Presumably, MSAs with a
greater presence of the manufacturing sector and a lower presence of the non-tradable
sector should experience a stronger spillover effect. For this purpose, I construct the
following measure as a proxy for the magnitude of the dependence on the manufacturing
sector:

25

Since the data on population is only available on an annual basis, the tests in Panel B of table 8 are
performed at MSA-year level.
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𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚,𝑡 =

𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑚,𝑡
𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑚,𝑡

,

(7)

where 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑚,𝑡 is the employment in the manufacturing sector of MSA m
at time t, and 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑚,𝑡 is the employment in the non-tradable sector of MSA
m at time t. A higher ratio represents a greater dependence of the non-tradable sector on
the manufacturing sector. To mitigate the effect of labor market dynamics on the evolution
of the relative size of the manufacturing sector and the non-tradable sector, I calculate the
time-series mean of the measure for each MSA and then split the sample based on the
median value of each MSA’s average dependence.26
Table 9 reports the regression results estimated with the subsamples of high and low
dependence. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 9 report the results when the local dependence
on manufacturing sector is high. The M&A Event dummy is negative and statistically
significant on both employment growth and wage growth. An MSA with high dependence
is expected to experience a 19.9-basis-point lower annual growth in employment and a
24.9-basis-point lower annual growth in wage when experiencing an M&A Event.
However, when I repeat the tests on the sample of MSAs with low dependence on the
manufacturing sector, the coefficient on the M&A Event dummy is statistically
insignificant, as shown in columns (3) and (4). Overall, results in Table 9 indicate that the
local labor market spillover is stronger when local on-tradable sector employment depends
more heavily on the manufacturing sector.
5.2.2. Deal Heterogeneity

26

I repeat the tests on subsamples based on cross-sectional median dependence. The results remain
statistically and economically unchanged.
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My analysis so far assumes that all types of mergers have a similar effect on the local
employment. In this section, I test the heterogeneous effect of various types of mergers.
For example, horizontal mergers are more likely to be motivated by potential synergy gain
through cost savings, such as workforce reduction, than other types of mergers. In that case,
target firms of horizontal mergers are expected to experience a greater post-merger
employment loss. Consequently, the local area should experience a stronger drop in
consumer demand, which can lead to a slower employment growth in the non-tradable
sector. Meanwhile, as previous studies, such as Tate and Yang (2016) and Lagaras (2018)
show, diversifying mergers are usually associated a lower probability of employment
reduction. Consequently, the MSAs where the target firms of non-horizontal mergers are
located should be less affected after M&A Events.
In Table 10, I test the local spillover effect of M&A Events that consist of different
types of takeovers. Specifically, I first calculate the percentage of horizontal deals in each
M&A Event in terms of value of transaction.27 The result indicates that there is a stronger
decrease in non-tradable sector employment if an M&A Event consists of a higher
proportion of horizontal deals. In addition, the M&A Event dummy is statistically
insignificant, indicating that the lower employment growth rate is almost completely driven
by horizontal deals. The result in column (3) is consistent with result in column (1),
indicating that M&A Events consist of more than 50% of horizontal deals are on average
associated with a 25-basis-point lower annual employment growth in the non-tradable
sector. However, despite a significant difference between the employment growth after
horizontal and non-horizontal M&A Events, there is no statistically significant difference

27

A merger is defined as horizontal if the acquirer and target are from the same four-digit SIC industry.
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in wage growth for M&A Events with different fraction of horizontal deals. In columns (2)
and (4), the M&A Event dummy is negative and statistically significant while the
interaction terms are neither statistically nor economically significant. A possible
explanation is that there is a downward pressure on the local consumer demand brought by
all M&A Events. However, as the horizontal M&A Events have a stronger effect on the
local consumer demand, they may drive the employers to lay off employees in addition to
cutting their wages. Therefore, although there is no significant difference in terms of the
wage growth decline between horizontal and non-horizontal M&A Events, there is a
significantly stronger decline in the employment growth in the non-tradable sector after
horizontal M&A Events.
Overall, the results in table 10 indicate that when there is a greater room for cost
reduction and labor restructuring, the post-merger employment reduction will be stronger
and there will be a stronger negative spillover to the local non-tradable sector.
5. 3. Minimum Wage Requirements and the Spillover Effect
In this section, I explore whether state level labor protection can pose a heterogeneous
effect on M&A-induced spillovers in the local labor market. Specifically, I focus on the
role of minimum wage requirements, which might affect the spillover effect to the nontradable sector through a direct channel. Previous studies (e.g., Gustafson and Kotter, 2018;
Cengiz et al., 2019) find that the non-tradable sector employs more minimum wage
employees and firms in the non-tradable sector are, therefore, more sensitive to the changes
in minimum wage requirements. 28 In that case, the spillover effect on the non-tradable

For example, Cengiz et al. (2019) point out that “The minimum wage is more binding in the non-tradable
sector (6.6%) than in the tradable sector (1.6%) or in the manufacturing sector (1.7%).”
28
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sector employment might be different due to the varying minimum wage requirements in
different states. I split the sample into two subsamples based on whether the state minimum
wage is above or below the federal minimum wage level and repeat the baseline tests in
each subsample.
Table 11 reports the estimated results. In columns (1) and (2), I test the effect of M&A
Events on the MSAs’ manufacturing sector employment growth in states with minimum
wages above/below the federal level. The results in columns (1) and (2) are statistically
and economically similar to each other, indicating that the effect of M&As on employment
in the manufacturing sector is not sensitive to minimum wage requirements, A possible
explanation is that firms in the manufacturing sector usually pay wages higher than the
legal minimum wage. In columns (3) and (4), I test the effect of M&A Events on the nontradable sector employment growth. The M&A Event dummy is only negative and
statistically significant when the states’ minimum wages are higher than the federal level.
Combined with the results from the previous sections, the results in Table 11 indicate
that while mergers in the manufacturing sector might have a negative effect on the nontradable sector employment growth through deteriorated consumer demand, lower
minimum wage requirements could mitigate the severity of the negative spillover in the
non-tradable sector. Finally, tests in columns (5) and (6) of Table 11 further confirm this
conjecture. Column (5) shows that M&A Events do not correlate with the average wage
growth rate in MSAs with minimum wage higher than the federal level while column (6)
indicates that non-tradable sector firms in MSAs with lower minimum wage might be able
to avoid cutting employments by lowering wages. The finding is consistent with Chava et
al. (2019), who suggest that increases in federal minimum wage worsen the financial health
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of small businesses in the affected states. It indicates that a lower level of minimum wage
may help to absorb the negative demand pressure on the local non-tradable sector
businesses.

6. Conclusion
In this paper, I examine the spillover effects of M&As on the local labor market. By
focusing on M&As in the manufacturing sector, I find that areas with a significant jump in
M&A activities are associated with lower employment growth not only in the
manufacturing sector but also in the non-tradable sector. The spillover is likely to be driven
by decreased local consumer demand. Areas with higher dependence on the manufacturing
sector and areas with targets involved in horizontal mergers receive a more substantial
spillover effect. Finally, lower minimum wage requirements help to ease the downward
pressure on employment in the non-tradable sector after the M&A Events.
This study highlights a previously overlooked externality of M&As. From a corporate
efficiency perspective, takeovers are often regarded as effective methods for cost reduction
and wealth creation; however, the improvement in private profits could be accompanied
by a cost on other stakeholders (Shleifer and Summers, 1988). In this paper, I find that
M&As have an unexpected externality on the local communities. While authorities, such
as the Federal Trade Commission and the Department and Justice, mostly consider the
potential effects of M&As on consumer welfare, the potential influence on local
communities also deserves attention.
Although this study sheds some light on the differential effect of M&As on local
employment across states with various minimum wage requirements, it still requires future
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research to provide a thorough investigation of the labor policy implications. It would also
be beneficial for future research to explore changes in local household behaviors resulting
from corporate takeovers.
Finally, the study also leaves an open question about the effect of M&As on the
employment of acquiring companies. This study, along with other existing research (e.g.,
Maksimovic et al., 2011; Li, 2013; Tate and Yang, 2016; Lagaras, 2018; Arnold, 2019), is
based on the assumption that M&As represent shocks to employment at the target
companies. However, it is still not clear whether acquirers would experience similar
employment reductions after M&As. Future research would be helpful to provide a
complete picture of the effects of M&As on employment at acquirers, targets, and the
communities where acquirers and targets are located.
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Figure 1. M&As in Manufacturing Sector
(a) Number of Deals

(b) Total value of Deals

Figure 1 presents the number (ratio) (Figure 1a) and the value (ratio) (Figure 1b) of merger and
acquisition deals in the manufacturing sector between 1990 to 2014. The bars represent the total
number (value) of transactions each year and the solid line represents the fraction of deals in the
manufacturing sector relative to all acquisitions each year. All values are in 2010 million dollars.
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Figure 2. M&As in Manufacturing Sector: Geographic Distribution

(a) Number of Deals

(b) Value of Deals

Figure 2 presents the geographic distribution of all acquisitions with targets in the manufacturing
sector. Figure 2a reports the quintiles of total number of deals in each county from 1990 to 2014.
Figure 2b reports the quintiles of total deal value (million dollars) in each county. All values are in
2010 dollars. Regions range from the darkest (highest quintile) to the lightest (lowest quintile).
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Table 1 Summary Statistics
The table presents the summary statistics. The MSA-quarterly data is from the U.S. Census
Quarterly Workforce Indicators (QWI) from 1990 to 2016. The manufacturing sector is defined as
industries with two-digit NAICS code 31-33. The non-tradable sector is defined as industries with
two-digit NAICS code 44-45 and 72. An M&A event is defined when the combined transaction
value in a quarter in an MSA is at least two standard deviations higher than the time-series mean
transaction value in the same MSA. All wages, incomes and market values are in 2010 dollars.
(1)
N

(2)
Mean

(3)
S.D.

(4)
Min

(5)
Max

MSA Characteristics
M&A Event
Total Employment (000s)
Manufacturing Sector Employment (000s)
Non-tradable Sector Employment (000s)
Unemployment Rate (%)
Population (000s)
Total Labor Force (000s)
Per capita Income (2010$)
% Manufacturing Employment
% Non-tradable Sector Employment
Manufacturing Sector Quarterly Wage (2010$)
Non-tradable Sector Quarterly Wage (2010$)

24,107 0.04
24,107 216.02
24,107 27.86
24,107 47.92
24,107 6.33
24,107 658.13
24,107 332.40
24,107 35,867.86
24,107 0.16
24,107 0.24
23,851 13,819.34
24,098 6,803.44

0.20
0
1
479.45
5.46
6,871.81
50.78
0.43
614.84
96.96
1.98
1,378.36
2.95
1.10
32.10
1,397.11 50.86 20,125.35
707.75
20.53
9,983.55
7,317.22 16,516.26 109,698.80
0.09
0.01
0.56
0.05
0.11
0.63
3,151.57 2,783.96 85,246.79
965.48 4,536.12 30,243.16

M&A Events Characteristics
Value of Transaction (2010$)
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3,475.15 11,344.07

45.74

117,016.97

Table 2 Effect of M&As on the Establishment Level Employment: Establishments in
HQ MSA
The table presents the effect of M&A deals on employment change at target establishments in the
headquarters MSAs using establishment-year sample. Target companies from SDC is matched with
the National Establishment Time Series (NETS) data from 1990 to 2014. Target is an indicator
equal to one if an establishment belongs to an M&A target and locates in the headquarters MSAs.
For each target establishment, a control establishment is selected based on a match on two-digit
NAICS, employment decile, and sales decile at the year before the deal announcement. If multiple
control establishments are found, the establishment with the closest employment level with the
target establishment is selected. I track the employment change of the target and control
establishments in a [T-3, T+3] window around each merger. Post is an indicator that equals one for
years after the merger completion. The control variables include establishment age, number of
branches in the firm, MSA population, average income, and unemployment. T-statistics are
reported in the parenthesis and the standard errors are clustered at the establishment level. ***, **,
* denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

Log (Employment)
(1)
(2)
Target
Post
Target × Post

0.041
(0.16)
-0.210***
(-5.72)
-0.097***
(-2.77)

-0.007
(-0.02)
-0.196***
(-5.19)
-0.155***
(-4.06)
-0.040
(-0.64)
0.053***
(3.82)

-0.015
(-0.05)
-0.201***
(-4.90)
-0.153***
(-3.83)
-0.055
(-0.87)
0.057***
(4.04)
-0.177*
(-1.86)
0.038
(0.10)
0.006
(0.46)

Yes
Yes
12,550
0.505

Yes
Yes
12,550
0.507

Yes
Yes
11,617
0.501

Log (Age)
Log (# of branches)
Log (Population)
Log (Average Income)
Unemployment Rate

Establishment FE
Year FE
Observations
Adjusted R2

(3)
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Table 3 Effect of M&A Events on Employment Growth in the Manufacturing Sector
The table presents the effect of M&A Events on employment growth in the manufacturing sector
(two-digit NAICS 31-33). Observations are MSA-quarters from 1990Q1 to 2016Q4. The
dependent variable is the annualized three-year employment growth rate. 𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−4,𝑡 is an
indicator equal to one if an MSA experienced an M&A event in the past four quarters. An M&A
event is defined when the combined transaction value in a quarter in an MSA is at least two standard
deviations higher than the time-series mean transaction value in the same MSA.
%𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡−4,𝑡 is the annual population growth in the MSA. %𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡−4,𝑡
is the annual average income growth in the MSA. High Manufacturing Area is an indicator equal
to one if the MSA’s share of employment in the manufacturing sector is higher than the national
median. T-statistics are reported in the parenthesis and the standard errors are clustered at the state
by time level. ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

Dependent Variable: Annualized Three-Year Employment Growth (×100)
(1)
(2)
(3)
𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−4,𝑡

-0.255***
(-2.87)

%𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡−4,𝑡
%𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡−4,𝑡

-0.240***
(-2.61)
-11.863***
(-3.31)
5.899***
(4.90)

High Manufacturing Area

MSA FE
Year-Quarter FE
State-Year-Quarter FE
Observations
Adjusted R2

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
24,107
22,731
0.409
0.418
Mean of Dep Var -1.119
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(4)

-0.250***
(-2.72)
-11.508***
(-3.25)
6.037***
(5.01)
-1.779***
(-19.91)

-0.335***
(-3.50)
-12.624***
(-3.11)
5.667***
(4.16)
-1.541***
(-15.97)

Yes
Yes
No
22,731
0.428

Yes
No
Yes
22,731
0.478

Table 4 Effect of M&A Events on Employment Growth in the Non-tradable Sector
The table presents the effect of M&A Events on employment growth in the non-tradable sector
(two-digit NAICS 44-45, 72). Observations are MSA-quarters from 1990Q1 to 2016Q4. The
dependent variable is the annualized three-year employment growth rate. 𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−4,𝑡 is an
indicator equal to one if an MSA experienced an M&A event in the past four quarters. An M&A
event is defined when the combined transaction value in a quarter in an MSA is at least two standard
deviations higher than the time-series mean transaction value in the same MSA.
%𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡−4,𝑡 is the annual population growth of the MSA. %𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡−4,𝑡
is the annual average income growth in the MSA. High Manufacturing Area is an indicator equal
to one if the MSA’s share of employment in the manufacturing sector is higher than the national
median. T-statistics are reported in the parenthesis and the standard errors are clustered at the state
by time level. ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

Dependent Variable: Annualized Three-Year Employment Growth (×100)
(1)
(2)
(3)
𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−4,𝑡

-0.103***
(-2.67)

%𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡−4,𝑡
%𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡−4,𝑡

-0.115***
(-2.99)
5.033**
(2.08)
6.282***
(10.95)

High Manufacturing Area

MSA FE
Year-Quarter FE
State-Year-Quarter FE
Observations
Adjusted R2

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
24,107
22,731
0.381
0.398
Mean of Dep Var -1.171
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(4)

-0.114***
(-2.95)
4.973**
(2.06)
6.259***
(10.96)
0.297***
(8.46)

-0.109***
(-3.10)
2.847
(1.11)
3.535***
(6.95)
0.329***
(9.25)

Yes
Yes
No
22,731
0.399

Yes
No
Yes
22,731
0.495

Table 5 Robustness Tests
The table presents robustness tests on the effect of M&A Events on employment growth in the nontradable sector (two-digit NAICS 44-45, 72). Observations are MSA-quarters from 1990Q1 to
2016Q4. The dependent variable is the annualized three-year employment growth rate.
𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−4,𝑡 is an indicator equal to one if an MSA experienced an M&A event in the past
four quarters. An M&A event is defined when the combined transaction value in a quarter in an
MSA is at least two standard deviations higher than the time-series mean transaction value in the
same MSA. Column (1) reports results estimated using the placebo time of M&A Events. Column
(2) reports the results estimated after removing overlapping M&A Events. Column (3) reports
results estimated with the sample excluding years after 2007. Column (4) controls for the MSA
level exposure to China’s import competition. The MSA level exposure to China’s import
competition is calculated as the aggregated product of the industry level import flow and industry
composition of the MSA in 1990. Then the measure is scaled by the national GDP. The data of
industry level import flow is available between 1991 and 2007 and is downloaded from David
Dorn’s website (https://www.ddorn.net/data.htm). The control variables include the one-year
population growth rate, the one-year average income growth rate, and whether the MSA’s share of
employment in the manufacturing sector is above the national median. T-statistics are reported in
the parenthesis and the standard errors are clustered at the state by time level. ***, **, * denotes
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

Dependent Variable: Annualized Three-Year Employment Growth (×100)
Placebo
Dates

𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−4,𝑡

Excluding
2008-2016

(1)

Excluding
Overlapping
Events
(2)

(3)

Control
Chinese
Import
(4)

-0.022
(-0.55)

-0.136***
(-2.82)

-0.176***
(-3.10)

-0.184***
(-4.34)

China’s Import

Control
MSA FE
State-Year-Quarter FE
Observations
Adjusted R2

-0.129***
(-5.88)
Yes
Yes
Yes
22,731
0.493
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Yes
Yes
Yes
22,731
0.493

Yes
Yes
Yes
9,352
0.513

Yes
Yes
Yes
14,628
0.505

Table 6 2SLS Estimates
The table presents regression estimates of the two stage least square regressions. Observations are MSA-quarters from 1990Q1 to 2016Q4.
𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−4,𝑡 is an indicator equal to one if an MSA experienced an M&A event in the past four quarters. An M&A event is defined when the
combined transaction value in a quarter in an MSA is at least two standard deviations higher than the time-series mean transaction value in the same
MSA. Columns (1) and (2) report results of the first stage estimation. Local discount is defined as the product of weighted average discount of a
four-digit NAICS Industry and the local industry presence. Columns (3) and (4) report results of reduced form regressions. Columns (5) to (8) report
the results from the second stage regressions. The control variables include the one-year population growth rate, the one-year average income growth
rate, and whether the MSA’s share of employment in the manufacturing sector is above the national median. T-statistics are reported in the
parenthesis and the standard errors are clustered at the state by time level. ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively.

First Stage
𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−4,𝑡

Discount

(1)

(2)

-0.017***
(-4.76)

-0.018***
(-4.79)

Reduced Form
Manufacturing
Nonsector Emp
tradable
Growth
sector Emp
Growth
(3)
(4)
0.353***
(5.20)

Yes
Yes
Yes
22,342
0.079

Yes
Yes
Yes
22,342
0.078

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

-22.159***
(-4.14)

-20.099***
(-4.01)

-5.710***
(-3.53)

-5.831***
(-3.57)

Yes
Yes
Yes
22,293
-

Yes
Yes
Yes
20,610
-

Yes
Yes
Yes
22,293
-

Yes
Yes
Yes
20,610
-

0.102***
(4.52)

𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−4,𝑡

Control
MSA FE
State-Year-Quarter FE
Observations
Adjusted R2

Second Stage
Manufacturing sector Emp Non-tradable sector Emp
Growth
Growth

Yes
Yes
Yes
22,342
0.479

Yes
Yes
Yes
22,342
0.497
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Table 7 Local Spillover of M&A Events: Household Level
The table reports results estimated with individual-year penal data from Survey of Income of
Program Participation (SIPP) in 1995 and 2003. In Panel A, the dependent variable in the first three
columns is whether the individual is working in the manufacturing sector. Dependent variable in
columns (4) to (6) is whether the individual is unemployed. Initial Mfg is defined as a dummy equal
to one if an individual was working in the manufacturing sector during her first appearance in the
sample. In Panel B, the dependent variable in the first three columns is whether the individual is
working in the non-tradable sector. Dependent variable in columns (4) to (6) is whether the
individual is unemployed. Initial Non-tradable is defined as one if an individual was working in the
non-tradable sector during her first appearance in the sample. M&A Events is an indicator equal to
one for MSA-years within 3 years of an M&A Event. The control variables in the table include log
(MSA labor force), log (MSA average wage), MSA unemployment rate, log(age), college degree,
married. T-statistics are reported in the parenthesis and the standard errors are clustered at the MSA
level. ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

Dep. Var
Initial Mfg ×
M&A Events
M&A Events

Control Variables
MSA FE
Year FE
Cohort FE
MSA ×Year FE
Individual FE
Observations
Adjusted R2

Panel A: Individuals Worked in the Manufacturing Sector
Manufacturing
Unemployed
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
-0.069*** -0.069*** -0.067*** 0.024*** 0.019**
0.020**
(-3.53)
(-3.48)
(-3.36)
(3.11)
(2.42)
(2.48)
0.006***
0.007***
-0.001
-0.001
(3.50)
(3.51)
(-0.27)
(-0.36)
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
258,260
0.771

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
258,260
0.771

Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
258,260
0.772
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No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
258,260
0.707

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
258,260
0.711

Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
258,260
0.711

Table 7 Continued
Panel B: Individuals Worked in the Non-tradable Sector
Non-tradable
Unemployed
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
-0.098***
-0.098***
-0.099***
0.037***
0.044***
0.044***
Initial Non-tradable ×
M&A Events
(-4.44)
(-4.44)
(-4.45)
(3.61)
(4.17)
(4.19)
0.016*** 0.016***
-0.004
-0.006
M&A Events
(3.71)
(3.72)
(-0.96)
(-1.46)
Dep. Var

Control Variables
MSA FE
Year FE
Cohort FE
MSA × Year FE
Individual FE
Observations
Adjusted R2

No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
258,260
0.665

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
258,260
0.665

Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
258,260
0.665
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No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
258,260
0.707

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
258,260
0.711

Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
258,260
0.711

Table 8 Wage and Mobility
The table presents the effect of M&A Events on the wage and employment mobility. Observations
in Panel A are MSA-quarters from 1990Q1 to 2016Q4. 𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−4,𝑡 is an indicator equal to
one if an MSA experienced an M&A event in the past four quarters. An M&A event is defined
when the combined transaction value in a quarter in an MSA is at least two standard deviations
higher than the time-series mean transaction value in the same MSA. Columns (1) and (2) of Panel
A report the effect of M&A Events on the annualized three-year growth rate of average quarterly
wage in the manufacturing sector (two-digit NAICS 31-33) and the non-tradable sector (two-digit
NAICS 44-45, 72). Column (3) of Panel A reports the effect of M&A Events on total payroll growth
in the non-tradable sector. Panel B reports the effect of M&A Events on annualized three-year
population growth, labor force growth and net migration inflow respectively estimated with MSAannual data. Net migration inflow is obtained from IRS tax filing data and is measured as net
migration inflow per 100 people. The control variables include the one-year population growth rate,
the one-year average income growth rate, and whether the MSA’s share of employment in the
manufacturing sector is above the national median. T-statistics are reported in the parenthesis and
the standard errors are clustered at the state by time level. ***, **, * denotes statistical significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

Dependent Variable: Annualized Three-Year Growth (×100)
Panel A: Wage and Payroll Growth
Manufacturing
NonNonWage
tradable
tradable
Wage
Payroll
(1)
(2)
(3)
𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−4,𝑡

Control
MSA FE
State-Year-Quarter FE
Observations
Adjusted R2
Panel B: Mobility Change

𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−4,𝑡

-0.203**
(-2.33)

-0.162***
(-4.17)

-0.238***
(-4.39)

Yes
Yes
Yes
21,019
0.304

Yes
Yes
Yes
21,270
0.751

Yes
Yes
Yes
22,707
0.698

Population

Net Inflow

(1)

Total Labor
Force
(2)

-0.065*
(-1.92)

-0.184***
(-2.75)

-0.237**
(-2.47)

Yes
Yes
Yes
5,758
0.761

Yes
Yes
Yes
5,758
0.557

Yes
Yes
Yes
4,734
0.707

Control
MSA FE
State-Year-Quarter FE
Observations
Adjusted R2
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(3)

Table 9 Merger Spillovers: MSA Heterogeneity
The table presents the effect of M&A Events on employment/wage growth in the non-tradable
sector (two-digit NAICS 44-45, 72) across MSAs with high and low dependence on the
manufacturing sector. Observations are MSA-quarters from 1990Q1 to 2016Q4. The dependent
variable is the annualized three-year employment/wage growth rate. 𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−4,𝑡 is an
indicator equal to one if an MSA experienced an M&A event in the past four quarters. An M&A
event is defined when the combined transaction value in a quarter in an MSA is at least two standard
deviations higher than the time-series mean transaction value in the same MSA. Dependence on
the manufacturing sector is defined as
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑖,𝑡 /𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑖,𝑡 .
Columns (1) and (2) report the employment/ wage growth when the MSA’s dependence on the
manufacturing sector is above the national median. Columns (3) and (4) report the employment/
wage growth when the MSA’s dependence on the manufacturing sector is below the national
median. The control variables include the one-year population growth rate, the one-year average
income growth rate, and whether the MSA’s share of employment in the manufacturing sector is
above the national median. T-statistics are reported in the parenthesis and the standard error is
clustered at the state by time level. ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively.

Dependent Variable: Annualized Three-Year Growth (×100)
Dependence on the Manufacturing Sector
High
Low
Emp
Wage
Emp
Wage
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−4,𝑡

Control
MSA FE
State-Year-Quarter FE
Observations
Adjusted R2

-0.199***
(-3.63)

-0.249***
(-4.04)

0.025
(0.53)

-0.041
(-0.69)

Yes
Yes
Yes
10,378
0.484

Yes
Yes
Yes
9,920
0.734

Yes
Yes
Yes
11,388
0.535

Yes
Yes
Yes
10,602
0.772
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Table 10 Merger Spillovers: Deal Heterogeneity
The table presents the effect of M&A Events on employment/wage growth in the non-tradable
sector (two-digit NAICS 44-45, 72) across different types of deals. Observations are MSA-quarters
from 1990Q1 to 2016Q4. The dependent variable is the annualized three-year employment/wage
growth rate. 𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−4,𝑡 is an indicator equal to one if an MSA experienced an M&A event
in the past four quarters. An M&A event is defined when the combined transaction value in a
quarter in an MSA is at least two standard deviations higher than the time-series mean transaction
value in the same MSA. % 𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 is the percentage of deal value that is from horizontal deals
in an M&A Event. 𝐼(𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙) is an indicator equal one if more than 50% of the combined deal
value in an M&A event is from horizontal deals. The control variables include the one-year
population growth rate, the one-year average income growth rate, and whether the MSA’s share of
employment in the manufacturing sector is above the national median. T-statistics are reported in
the parenthesis and the standard errors are clustered at the state by time level. ***, **, * denotes
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

Dependent Variable: Annualized Three-Year Employment Growth (×100)
Emp
Wage
Emp
Wage
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−4,𝑡
𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−4,𝑡
× % 𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−4,𝑡
× 𝐼(𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙)
Controls
MSA FE
State-Year-Quarter FE
Observations
Adjusted R-squared

0.029
(0.54)
-0.242***
(-3.28)

-0.228***
(-3.37)
0.091
(1.05)

Yes
Yes
Yes
22,563
0.495

Yes
Yes
Yes
21,270
0.721
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0.033
(0.63)

-0.190***
(-2.88)

-0.250***
(-3.47)

0.026
(0.30)

Yes
Yes
Yes
22,563
0.495

Yes
Yes
Yes
21,270
0.721

Table 11 Labor Protection and Spillover Effect
The table presents the effect of M&A Events on employment/wage growth in across states with
different levels of minimum wage. Observations are MSA-quarters from 1990Q1 to 2016Q4. The
dependent variable is the annualized three-year employment/wage growth rate. 𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−4,𝑡
is an indicator equal to one if an MSA experienced an M&A event in the past four quarters. An
M&A event is defined when the combined transaction value in a quarter in an MSA is at least two
standard deviations higher than the time-series mean transaction value in the same MSA. Columns
(1) and (2) report changes in employment growth in the manufacturing sector (two-digit NAICS
31-33) and columns (3) and (4) report changes in employment growth in the non-tradable sector
(two-digit NAICS 44-45, 72). Columns (5) and (6) report regression estimates on wage growth in
the non-tradable sector. High and low minimum wage is defined based on whether the state’s
minimum wage level is higher than the federal minimum wage. The control variables include the
one-year population growth rate, the one-year average income growth rate, and whether the MSA’s
share of employment in the manufacturing sector is above the national median. T-statistics are
reported in the parenthesis and the standard errors are clustered at the state level. ***, **, * denotes
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

Dependent Variable: Annualized Three-Year Growth (×100)
Manufacturing Sector
Employment Growth
High
Low
(1)
(2)
𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−4,𝑡

Control
MSA FE
State-Year-Quarter
FE
Observations
Adjusted R2

Non-tradable Sector
Employment Growth
High
Low
(3)
(4)

Non-tradable Sector
Wage Growth
High
Low
(5)
(6)

-0.436***
(-3.87)

-0.348*
(-1.82)

-0.287***
(-5.70)

-0.093
(-0.99)

0.045
(0.44)

-0.589***
(-2.92)

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

14,944
0.529

6,178
0.525

14,944
0.545

6,178
0.618

14,943
0.254

6,136
0.300
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Appendix
A1. Theoretical Model
In this section, I use a simple model to illustrate how mergers in the manufacturing
sector could affect employment in the local non-tradable sector. Consider an MSA with
only two sectors: a manufacturing sector and a non-tradable sector. I use capital letters to
denote the variables associated with the manufacturing sector and lowercase letters for the
variables associated with the non-tradable sector. There are N producers in the
manufacturing sector and n producers in the non-tradable sector. As different skill sets are
needed in the non-tradable sector and the manufacturing sector, the labor markets for the
two sectors are segmented. I assume that the manufacturing sector has an increasing and
convex labor supply curve. Specifically, that the inverse labor supply curve is 𝑊(𝐿) =
𝑊0 + 𝛼𝐿𝑀 , where M ≥ 1. For simplicity, each producer in the manufacturing sector
produces only one product and the product i is traded nationally at a nation-wide fixed
price of Pi. Without loss of generality, I assume that the only production input is labor and
the production function in the manufacturing sector is given by the function 𝑄𝑖 = 𝐶𝑖 𝐿𝑖 ,
where 𝐶𝑖 measures the fixed assets used in production and cannot be easily adjusted.
However, the local labor market is oligopsonistic, where producers in the manufacturing
sector make employment decisions, knowing that the number of employees they hire has
an impact on the market wage. (See Boal et al., 1997 for a literature survey on monopsony
in the labor market.) Hence, producer i’s profit maximization problem is:
max Π𝑖 = (𝑃𝑖 𝐶𝑖 − 𝑊(𝐿))𝐿𝑖 ,
𝐿𝑖
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(A1)

where 𝐿 = ∑𝑁
𝑖=1 𝐿𝑖 .
The first-order condition implies that
𝐿𝑖 =

𝑃𝑖 𝐶𝑖 −𝑊(𝐿)
𝑊 ′ (𝐿)

=

𝑃𝑖 𝐶𝑖 −𝑊0 −𝛼𝐿𝑀
𝛼𝑀𝐿𝑀−1

.

(A2)

Summing up the first-order conditions for all N firms, we get:
1

𝐿=[

𝑀
∑𝑁
𝑖=1 𝑃𝑖 𝐶𝑖 −𝑁𝑊0

(𝑁+𝑀)𝛼

] .

(A3)

Proposition 1. The aggregate employment in the manufacturing sector is positively related
to the fixed assets each firm uses in production.
Proof. After differentiating 𝐿 with respect to 𝐶𝑖 , we get
1−𝑀

𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝐶𝑖

=

𝑀
1 ∑𝑁
𝑖=1 𝑃𝑖 𝐶𝑖 −𝑁𝑊0
[
]
(𝑁+𝑀)𝛼
𝑀

𝑃𝑖 > 0.

(A4)

Now consider that there is an M&A deal where firm j is the target. The acquirer of the
merger deal then chooses the post-merger allocation of fixed assets to the target 𝐶𝑗′ by
comparing the marginal return of fixed assets at the acquiring and target companies. Then
the change in the aggregate employment will be affected by the acquirer’s decisions on the
allocation of production assets. For example, if the acquirer firm increases investment by
allocating more assets in the local area (𝐶𝑗′ > 𝐶𝑗 ), there will be an ex-post increase in
aggregate employment. However, of acquirers decide to reallocate the production fixed
assets to produce other products (𝐶𝑗′ < 𝐶𝑗 ), then the aggregate employment will decrease.
Finally, consider the extreme case that the acquirer company decides to reallocate all of the
production assets of the target (𝐶𝑗′ = 0 and number of firms in the local area will become
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N – 1 after the merger), then it can be shown that the total employment, L decreases if 𝑃𝑖
is reasonably large or the convexity of the wage function, M, is large enough. Since W(L)
is an increasing function of L, if L decreases, W will decrease. As a result, the total labor
income in the manufacturing sector, 𝐼 = 𝑊 × 𝐿 will decrease.
The change in employment in the manufacturing sector then diffuses to the nontradable sector through fluctuations in total labor income. Producers in the non-tradable
sector compete for local businesses; hence, I model the non-tradable sector competition as
a Cournot oligopoly game. For simplicity, I assume that each unit of labor produces one
unit of good in the non-tradable sector. Producers choose production quantity, 𝑙𝑖 , and the
price, p, is determined by 𝑝 = 𝑎(𝐼) − 𝑏(𝐼) ∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑙𝑖 , where 𝑎(𝐼) > 0 and 𝑏(𝐼) > 0. I
assume 𝑎(𝐼) is increasing in I and 𝑏(𝐼) is decreasing in I to capture the dependence of the
non-tradable sector on local demand. If total labor income in the manufacturing sector
decreases, local demand decreases, indicated by a lower 𝑎(𝐼) and higher 𝑏(𝐼). The inverse
labor supply curve for the non-tradable sector is 𝑤(𝑙) = 𝑤0 + 𝛽𝑙 𝑚 , where 𝑚 ≥ 0. The
Nash equilibrium solution of the Cournot oligopoly game is standard. Producer i’s profit
maximization problem is:
max π𝑖 = (𝑝 − 𝑤(𝑙))𝑙𝑖 .
𝑙𝑖

(A5)

The first-order condition implies that
𝑙𝑖 =

𝑎(𝐼)−𝑏(𝐼) ∑𝑛
𝑖=1 𝑙𝑖 −𝑤(𝑙)
𝑏(𝐼)+𝑤′(𝑙)

.

Summing up the first-order conditions for all n firms, we get:
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(A6)

𝑙=

𝑛𝑎(𝐼)−𝑛𝑏(𝐼)𝑙−𝑛𝑤(𝑙)
𝑏(𝐼)+𝑤′(𝑙)

.

(A7)

Proposition 2. The aggregate employment in the non-tradable sector is positively related
to the total income I.
Proof. Substituting w(l) and w’(l) into equation (A7), we get
𝑙=

𝑛𝑎(𝐼)−𝑛𝑏(𝐼)𝑙−𝑛(𝑤0 +𝛽𝑙𝑚 )
𝑏(𝐼)+𝑚𝛽𝑙𝑚−1

,

(A8)

and re-arranging equation (A8) gives us
(𝑛 + 1)𝑏(𝐼)𝑙 + (𝑚 + 𝑛)𝛽𝑙 𝑚 = 𝑛𝑎(𝐼) − 𝑛𝑤0.

(A9)

Let 𝐹(𝑙, 𝐼) = (𝑛 + 1)𝑏(𝐼)𝑙 + (𝑚 + 𝑛)𝛽𝑙 𝑚 − 𝑛𝑎(𝐼) + 𝑛𝑤0 = 0 . Applying the implicit
function theorem to solve for
𝜕𝑙

𝜕𝑙
𝜕𝐼

, we get
(𝑛+1)𝑏′ (𝐼)𝑙−𝑛𝑎′ (𝐼)

𝐹

= − 𝐹𝐼 = (𝑛+1)𝑏(𝐼)+𝑚(𝑚 + 𝑛)𝛽𝑙𝑚−1 > 0.
𝜕𝐼
𝑙

(A10)

Total employment in the non-tradable sector is increasing in I, hence, the employment
shock spills over from the manufacturing sector to the non-tradable sector.
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Figure A1 Share of Employments in the Manufacturing Sector Over Time
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Figure A1 presents the share of employment in the manufacturing sector in the U.S. from
1990 to 2019. Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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Table A1 Employment Concentration
The table reports the employment concentration at the acquirer/target headquarters MSAs. The data
on the employment is from the Publicly Listed National Establishment Time Series (NETS). The
observations are from 1990 to 2014. Both acquirers and targets are publicly traded firms from the
manufacturing sector (two-digit NAICS code 31-33). % Emp at Hq MSA is the percentage of the
target employment that is in the headquarters MSA. I(Headquarters MSA is the highest) is an
indicator equal to one if a company’s employment at its headquarters MSA is the highest among
all regions that the company operates.

Acquirers
Emp at Headquarters MSA
Emp at Other MSA
Total Emp
% Emp at Hq MSA
I(HQ MSA is the highest)
Targets
Emp at Headquarters MSA
Emp at Other MSA
Total Employment
% Emp at Hq MSA
I(HQ MSA is the highest)

(1)
N

(2)
Mean

(3)
S.D.

(4)
Min

(5)
Max

569
569
569
569
569

3,516
13,324
16,816
0.386
0.598

5,910
25,767
28,452
0.302
0.491

7
0
20
0.0035
0

35,037
169,566
175,739
1
1

569
569
569
569
569

898.5
1,924
2,905
0.582
0.717

1,852
4,496
6,068
0.349
0.451

3
0
3
0.00792
0

13,457
27,926
38,781
1
1
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Table A2 Summary Statistics: Establishment Level
The table presents the summary statistics at the establishment level for tests reported in table 2.
Target companies from SDC is matched with the National Establishment Time Series (NETS) data
from 1990 to 2014. Age is the age of the establishment. Number of Branches measures the number
of branches of the company. Population, Average Income and Unemployment are all at the MSA
level. All wages, incomes and market values are in 2010 dollars.

(1)
N

(2)
Mean

(3)
S.D.

(4)
Min

(5)
Max

Establishments at HQ MSA
Employment
Age
Number of Branches
Population
Average Income (2010$)
Unemployment Rate

12,558
321.10
471.81
0
2,500
12,558
10.29
5.24
1
25
12,558
165.05
432.52
1
10,997
11,631 4,979,709.03 5,625,054.54
50,46
20,125,35
11,631
42,265.31
8,560.27
16,516.26 105,361.33
11,625
5.34
1.96
1.20
20.30
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Table A3 Summary Statistics: Household Level
The table reports the summary statistics of the household level sample. The data is from Survey of
Income and Program Participation (SIPP) from 1995 to 2003. Individuals with age below 16 or
above 70 are dropped from the sample. College is an indicator equal to one if the individual
achieved college degree or higher. Employed is an indicator equal to one if the individual is
employed. Manufacturing is an indicator equal to one if the individual is working in manufacturing
sector (two-digit NAICS code 31-33). Non-tradable is an indicator equal to one if the individual is
working in non-tradable sector (two-digit NAICS code 44-45, 72).

(1)
N

(2)
Mean

(3)
S.D.

(4)
Min

(5)
Max

292,872
292,872
292,872
292,872
292,872
292,872

39.77
0.73
0.53
0.02
0.09
0.12

14.46
0.45
0.50
0.12
0.29
0.33

16
0
0
0
0.00
0.00

70
1
1
1
1
1

Individual Characteristics
Age
Employed
Married
College Degree
Manufacturing
Non-tradable
MSA Characteristics
Population
Average Income (in 2010$)
Total Labor Force
Unemployment

292,872 5,312,092.19 5,685,703.84 118,796 19,248,312
292,872
35,908.96
7,037.70
18,271
53,199
292,872 2,667,367.58 2,757,754.39 64,538.62 9,339,938
292,872
0.05
0.02
0.02
0.20
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Table A4 Total Employment Change
The table presents the effect of M&A Events on the total employment growth. Observations are
MSA-quarters from 1990Q1 to 2016Q4. The dependent variable is the annualized three-year
employment growth rate. 𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−4,𝑡 is an indicator equal to one if an MSA experienced an
M&A event in the past four quarters. An M&A event is defined when the combined transaction
value in a quarter in an MSA is at least two standard deviations higher than the time-series mean
transaction value in the same MSA. %𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡−4,𝑡 is the annual population growth
in the MSA. %𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡−4,𝑡 is the annual average income growth in the MSA. High
Manufacturing Area is an indicator equal to one if the MSA’s share of employment in the
manufacturing sector is higher than the national median. T-statistics are reported in the parenthesis
and the standard errors are clustered at the state by time level. ***, **, * denotes statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

Dependent Variable: Annualized Three-Year Employment Growth (×100)
(1)
(2)
(3)
𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−4,𝑡

-0.191***
(-4.96)

-0.183***
(-4.62)
-1.422
(-0.65)
6.223***
(7.87)

-0.184***
(-4.64)
-1.405
(-0.64)
6.229***
(7.86)
-0.086**
(-2.46)

-0.146***
(-3.96)
-3.163
(-1.61)
4.025***
(5.17)
0.012
(0.34)

Yes
Yes
No
24,107
0.536

Yes
Yes
No
22,731
0.542

Yes
Yes
No
22,731
0.542

Yes
No
Yes
22,563
0.641

%𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡−4,𝑡
%𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡−4,𝑡
High Manufacturing Area

MSA FE
Year-Quarter FE
State-Year-Quarter FE
Observations
Adjusted R2

(4)
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Table A5 Additional Robustness Check
The table presents results of additional robustness tests. Observations are MSA-quarters from
1990Q1 to 2016Q4. Columns (1) to (4) repeat baseline regressions with alternative definitions of
M&A Events. In column (1) an M&A Event is defined as one if the combined transaction value in
a quarter in an MSA is at least one standard deviation higher than the time-series mean transaction
value in the same MSA. In column (2) an M&A Event is defined as one if the combined transaction
value in a quarter in an MSA is at least three standard deviations higher than the time-series mean
transaction value in the same MSA. In column (3) an M&A Event is defined when the transaction
value in a quarter is the highest within the MSA during the sample period. In column (4) an M&A
Event is defined as the logarithm of combined transaction value of the last four quarters. In column
(5), the employment growth is measured by the annualized five-year growth rate. The control
variables include the one-year population growth rate, the one-year average income growth rate,
and whether the MSA’s share of employment in the manufacturing sector is above the national
median. T-statistics are reported in the parenthesis and the standard errors are clustered at the state
by time level. ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

Dependent Variable: Annualized Employment Growth (×100)
Largest
Total
1 S.D.
3 S.D.
Deal
Value
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Panel A: Manufacturing Sector Employment Growth
𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−4,𝑡

-0.249***
(-2.83)

-0.333***
(-3.15)

Control Variables
Yes
Yes
MSA FE
Yes
Yes
State-Year-Quarter FE
Yes
Yes
Observations
22,731
22,731
0.478
0.478
Adjusted R2
Panel B: Non-tradable Sector Employment Growth
𝑀&𝐴 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−4,𝑡

Control Variables
MSA FE
State-Year-Quarter FE
Observations
Adjusted R2

5-Yr Emp
Growth
(5)

-0.450***
(-3.48)

-0.034***
(-2.75)

-0.731***
(-5.52)

Yes
Yes
Yes
22,731
0.479

Yes
Yes
Yes
22,731
0.478

Yes
Yes
Yes
19,841
0.562

-0.140***
(-4.34)

-0.167***
(-4.26)

-0.189***
(-3.80)

-0.018***
(-3.81)

-0.123**
(-2.25)

Yes
Yes
Yes
22,731
0.495

Yes
Yes
Yes
22,731
0.495

Yes
Yes
Yes
22,731
0.495

Yes
Yes
Yes
22,731
0.495

Yes
Yes
Yes
19,841
0.637
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